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The following papers, numbered 1 to __ , were read on this motion to/for---------------
Notice of Motion/Order to Show Cause -Affidavits - Exhibits I No(s). _ ____ _ 
Answering Affidavits- Exhibits-------- --- ------
Replying Affidavits--------------- -----------
I No(s). - -----
INo(s). ____ _ _ 
Upon the foregoing papers, it Is ordered that this motion Is 
Motion sequence 001 is decided in accordance with the annexed Memorandum Decision. It is 
hereby 
ADJUDGED that the petition of for relief, pursuant to CPLR Article 78, of petitioner 
Gail Hanna is denied, and the petition is dismissed. And it is further 
ORDERED that counsel for Petitioner shall serve a copy of this Order with Notice of 
Entry within twenty (20) days of entry on counsel for Respondent. 
Dated: 5 · J.. l· )_p li? __e.c. 
/ HON. CAROL R. EDMEAD 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
COUNTY OF NEW YORK: lAS PART 35 · 
--------------------------------------------------------------------)( 
In the Matter of the Application of GAIL HANNA, 
Petitioner, 
For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules 
-against-
NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE, 
Respondent. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------)( 
HON. CAROL R. EDMEAD, JSC: 
Index No.: 150140/18 
DECISION/ORDER 
In this Article 78 proceedi~g, petitioner Gail Hanna (Hanna) seeks a judgment to overturn 
an order of the respondent New York State Board of Parole (Parole Board) as arbitrary and 
capricious (motion sequence number 00 I). For the following reasons, this petition is denied. 
FACTS 
On October I 0, 1995, Hanna was convicted via plea bargain of the crimes of second 
degree murder (Penal Law§ 125.25 [I)), and second degree criminal possession of a weapon 
(Penal Law§ 265.03). See respondent's mem oflaw, exhibit A. She received an indeterminate 
sentence of20 years to life, and was incarcerated at the Bedford Hills Correctional Facility until 
20 I 0, when she was transferred to the Taconic Correctional Facility, where she now resides. See 
petition,~~ 21-22. Haf1-na is currently 68 years of age. Id., ~ 9. 
On January I 0, 2017, Hanna appeared at a hearing before the Parole Board to petition for 
her release from confinement. See petition,~ 33. The Parole Board denied her petition, but 
directed that she could renew it in January 2019 (the Parole Board decision). !d.; exhibit A. On 
May 17, 2017, Hanna filed an administrative appeal of the Parole Board's denial. !d.; petition,~ 
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44. On September I I, 2017, the Parole Board Commissioner's Office issued a decision that 
denied Hanna 's administrative appeal (the Commissioner's decision). !d.; petition,~ 45. The 
relevant portions of the Commissioner's decision will be quoted later, since it is rather lengthy 
!d.; exhibit R. In any case, Hanna thereafter commenced this Article 78 proceeding to overturn 
the Commissioner's decision as arbitrary and capricious (motion sequence number 001 ). 
DISCUSSION 
The standard of review that governs an Article 78 challenge to a Parole Board 
determination is more stringent than that which is normally applied in Article 78 proceedings. 
The Court of Appeals unequivocally states that "[i]n New York, the Parole Board holds the 
power to decide whether to release a sentenced prisoner on parole," not the courts, and that, as a 
result, "[j]udicial intervention is warranted only when there is a 'showing of.irrationality 
bordering on impropriety."' Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 (2000). Here, after thoroughly 
reviewing the record, the court finds that the petitioner has not made such a showing. 
Executive Law (Exec Law)§ 259-i governs the "[p]rocedures for the conduct of the work 
of the state board of parole," and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
"Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for good 
conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if 
there is a reasonable probabi lity that, if such inmate is released, he will live and 
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is ·not incompatible 
with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness ofhis crime 
as to undermine respect for law. In making the parole release decision, the 
procedures. adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred 
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be considered: (i) the 
institutional record including program goals and accomplislunents, academic 
achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy and 
interactions with staff and inmates; (ii) performance, if any, as a participant in a 
temporary release program; (iii) release plans including community resources, 
employment, education and training and support services available to the inmate; 
2 
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(iv) any deportation order issued by the federal government against the inmate 
while in the custody of the department and any recommendation regarding 
deportation made by the commissioner of the department pursuant to section one 
hundred forty-seven of the correction law; (v) any current or prior statement made 
to the board by the crime victim or the victim's representative, where the crime 
victim is deceased or is mentally or physically incapacitated; (vi) the length of the 
determinate sentence to which the inmate would be subject had he or she received 
a sentence pursuant to section 70.70 or section 70.71 of the penal law for a felony 
defined in article two hundred twenty or article two hundred twenty-one of the 
penal law; (vii) the seriousness of the offense with due consideration to the type of 
sentence, length of sentence and recommendations of the sentencing court, the 
di strict attorney, the attorney for the inmate, the pre-sentence probation report as 
well as consideration of any mitigating and aggravating factors, and activities 
following arrest prior to confinement; and (viii) prior criminal record, including 
the nature and pattern of offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or parole 
supervision and institutional confinement .... " 
Exec Law § 259-i (2) (c) (A). Here, Hanna's counsel rai se five arguments that the Parole Board 
violated the foregoing statutory proce<;lures when it rendered its September 11, 2017 decision. 
The court will review each argument in turn. 
First, counsel for Hanna asserts that "the Parole Board abused its discretion and violated 
lawful procedures by relying on erroneous information regarding [petitioner's] record." See 
petitioner's mem of law at 7- 14. Counsel avers that this "erroneous information" consists of 
non-existent " letters of opposition" to Hanna's parole application that one of the Parole Board 
Commissioners referred to at Hanna' s January 10, 2017 hearing. Jd. Counsel specifically 
objects that the sole "letter of opposi tion" was, in fact, a November 24, 1995 letter that the 
Warren County District Attorney's Office prepared shortly after Hanna was originally sentenced, 
and asserts that neither the Warren County District Attorney, the DOC or any other official 
actually submitted any new " letters of opposition" to her 2017 parole application, despite the 
Commissioner's apparent claim to the contrary. !d. The court notes that counsel raised this same 
3 
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argument at Hanna's September 11, 2017 administrative appeal, and that the Commissioner's 
Office decision disposed of it in the following excerpt: 
"Appellant's first contention is that the Board relied on erroneous 
information, arguing that a commissioner's reference to letters of opposition from 
~fficial sources received in response to inquiries from DOCCS amounts an error 
requiring a de novo interview. While appellant is correct that the reliance on 
erroneous information may provide grounds for appeal (see 9 NYCRR § 
. 8006.3(a]; see e.g., Matter of Plevy v Travis, 17 AD3d 879, 880 (3d Dept 2005]), 
the mere presence of erroneous information, without any indication it was relied 
upon in the determination, is insufficient to require the decision be vacated (see 
Matter of Restivo v New York State Board of Parole, 70 AD 3d 1096, 1097 [3d 
Dept. 201 0]). This is so even where the erroneous information amounts to an 
inaccurate statement by a member of the Board during the interview not relied 
upon in the decision (see Maller of Gordon v Stanford, 148 AD 3d 1502, 1503 [3d 
Dept 20 17]; Matter of Khatib v N(!W York State Bd. of Parole, 118 AD 3d 1207, 
1208 [3d Dept 2014]). 
"The record reflects that the Board did not rely on erroneous information 
in rendering its decision. The Board is required to consider any recommendation 
from the prosecutor, which in the case of appellant, was the Warren County 
District Attorney (see Executive Law §259-i [2] [c) (A] [vii]). The Board 
received a letter from the office of this District Attorney which the Board then 
considered as required by law (see id.). Although appellant refers to an email 
from an attorney in the office of Counsel to the Department of Corrections and 
Community Supervision ('DOCCS') to·support her claim that no correspondence 
from the District Attorney or sentencing court was received by the Board, the full 
text of the email included as an exhibit in the brief on appeal reflects the opposite, 
noting that in 1995 the Board received a letter from the Warren County District 
Attorney's Office. That the Board may have been mistaken as to whether this 
letter was sent in response to the 2014 request does not alter the Board's 
obligation to consider it. Nor is the reference during the interview to 'letters' in 
the plural an error requiring the determination be vacated; while the commissioner 
may have misspoken during the interview, the decision itself accurately describes 
'official opposition', (see Matter of Gordon, 148 AD3d at 1503). 
"Notably, there is no indication or allegation that the letter from the 
District Attorney contains a factual inaccuracy. Thus, appellant's reliance on 
Matter of Comfort is misplaced; in that case, unlike here, the letters of opposition 
at issue contained a factual misrepresentation as to the nature of the instant 
offense (see Mdtter ofComfort v New York State Bd. of Parole, 101 AD3d 1450, 
1451 (3d Dept. 20 12] ('Given this misrepresent~tion regarding petitioner's 
4 
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convictions, and it appearing that the 'significant' letters in opposition to 
petitioner's release were prompted hy the erroneous characterization of 
petitioner's conviction, it was error for the Board to credit those tainted letters')). 
Consequently, appellant has not shown that she was prejudiced by any 
consideration of inaccurate information by the Board (see Matter of Gordon v 
Stanford, 148 AD3d at ·1503).'' 
See petition, exhibit R. In this portion of its decision, the Parole Board Commissioner's Office 
correctly noted that Exec Law §259-i (~)(c) (A) (vii) requires the Parole Board to assess "the 
seriousness of the offense with due consider~tion to the type of sentence, length of sentence and 
recommendations of the .. ·. district attorney, ... as well as ... any mitigating and aggravating 
factors, and activities following arrest prior to confinement" when reviewing a parole request. 
The Commissioner's office also found that the Parole Board had done so, because it indirectly 
referred to the Warren County District Attorney's November 24, 1995 Jetter at Hanna's January 
10, 2017 hearing. The Commissioner's Office. further found tha~ that letter contained no 
"erroneous information" irself, and noted that t~e "error" Hanna complained of appeared to be 
the fact that no 11ew "letters of opposition" had been generated for submission at her 2017 parole 
hearing. Finally, the Parole .Board Commissioner's Office found that, in such circumstances, 
. . 
controlling case law holds that consideration of such a letter is both required and permissible. 
. . 
Having reviewed the record and the above~cited precedent, the court finds that the 
Commissioner's office reasonably_ interpreted both the facts and the law. In her reply papers, 
. Hanna nevertheless objects that she "preserved her claim that the ( 1995 letter) does not constitute 
I 
official opposition" to her parole application, and that, as of today, "no official opposition 
exists." See petitioner's reply mem at 4-5. Hanna cites Matter of Gordon v Stanford (I 48 AD 3d 
1502, 1503 (3d Dept 20 17)) to support her position. However, the Parole Board Commissioner's 
5 
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Office previously found that that decision was not on point, either factually .or on the law. Upon 
reviewing that holding, the court agrees with the Parole Board Commissioner's Office's. Gordon 
r 
is distinguishable because it involved a glaring factual inaccuracy about the circumstances of a 
fatal shooting, and does not involve "official opposition" letters to a parole request, at all. 
Therefore, Gordon is not on point and does not support Hanna's position. As a result, there is no 
justification for the court to alter the Commissioner's finding, that the Parole Board did not rely 
on "erroneous information," on the ground that this finding was an act of"irrationality bordering 
on impropriety." It was not. That finding was, instead, entirely reasonable. Therefore, the court 
rejects Hanna's first argument. . 
Next, counsel for Hanna argues that " the Parole Board impermissibly relied on the 
Commissioners' erroneous personal beliefs" at the January 10, 2017 hearing. See petitioner's 
mem of law at 14-24. Hanna specifically objects to the Parole Board 's alleged reliance on its 
"personal beliefs" about three matters: 1) Hanna's "domestic abuse history; 2) Hanna's "mental 
health;" and 3) Hanna's "crime." !d. at I 5. The court notes again that the Commissioner's 
decision previously addressed these arguments. With respect to the first, Hanna's mental health, 
the Commissioner's decision stated as follows: 
"Appellant next contends that the Board improperly based its decision on personal 
opinions, namely opinions regarding appellant's mental health and her description 
of her relationship with the victim as abusive. Although the Board may not 
consider factors 'outside the scope of the applicable statute,' the transcript and 
decision do not reflect that the Board's determination was based upon such 
non-statutory factors. (Matter of King, 83 NY2d 788). The record reflects that 
appellant 's allegations of abuse by the victim and their impact upon her mental 
state were inseparable from her explanation of why she committed the instant 
offense; namely, that she killed the victim in the spur of the moment because she 
feared hi s response to the imminent discovery of their financial straits and that 
thi s fear was premised upon abuse perpetrated by th_e victim. Given the required 
6 
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consideration of the severity of the offense and the importance the Court of 
Appeals has ascribed to assessing an inmate 's remorse and insight in evaluating 
an inmate's rehabilitation, this consideration was entirely proper. (see Matter of 
Silmon, 95 NY2d at 4 77). 
"Appellant's argument that consideration of appellant's mental health history was 
inappropriate is unpersuasive. The Board is expressly required to consider an 
inmate's 'institutional record including ... therapy' (Executive Law §259-i [2] [c) 
[A) [i]) and an inmate's mental health, including his or her history of menta l 
illness and treatment, has been repeatedly found to be a proper subject for Board 
consideration, (see e.g. Matter ofGssime v New York State Div, of Parole, 84 
AD 3d 1630 [3d Dept], lv. dismissed, 17 NY 3d 84 7 [20 II] [' Board also took into 
account the mental health assistance provided to him during his. incarceration']; 
Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d 863 (3d Dept 1996) (' prior history of 
mental il lness' appropriate consideration]; Matter of Baker v Russi, 188 AD2d 
771 (3d Dept 1992] [Board considered 'apparent need for psychological 
counsel ing' ]). 
"While appellant argues that the Board discussion of her mental health history 
amounted to an improper diagnosis by someone who is not a mental health 
professional, the record reflects that the Board made no such diagnosis. The 
Board's inquiry was based on information in the PreSentence Investigation Report 
(the ' PSr Report'), which the Board is required to consider (see Executive Law§ 
259-i (2] [c] (A] [vii]). Appellant's rel iance on People v Irwin (1 9 Misc3d 
11 18(A] [Onondaga Co Ct 2008]) is misplaced; that case addressed the suitability 
of material for inclusion in a ,PSI Report, not its consideration by the Board. Once 
material is properly included in the PSJ Report, which the Board is required by 
Executive Law§ 259-i (2) (c).(A) (vii) to consider, it may be relied upon by the 
Board (see Matter of Carter v Evans, 81 AD 3d l 031, I 031-32 (3d Dept 2011]) 
and appellant may not collaterally challenge its veracity in a parole interview (see 
Mafler of Delrosario v Stanford, 140 AD 3d 1515 (3d Dept 20 16])." 
See notice of motion, exhibit R. In Hanna's motion, counsel avers that it "does not cha llenge the 
holdings of [the above cited case law], but emphasizes that the Board ... did more than simply 
consider the facts surrounding Hanna's mental health; it inserted unfounded medical opinions 
into the parole interview based on the commissioners' unqualified personal beliefs." See 
petitioner' s mem of law at 19. However, this assertion is flatly contradicted by the portion of the 
Commissioners' decision which found that the admini strative record showed that the Parole 
7 
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Board relied solely on the medi<;al opinions contained in Hanna's PSI report, rather than its own 
purportedly "unfounded medical opinions." Having itself reviewed both the PSI report, and the 
• 
transcript of the parole Board's questioning at the January 10, 2017 hearing, the court agrees that 
the commissioners' questions were, indeed, apparently drawn verbatim from the diagnoses 
contained in the PSI report. See petition, exhibit A; respondent's mem of law, exhibit A (in 
camera review only). As a result, the court finds that the Commissioner's finding, that the Parole 
Board "made no such [improper med ical] diagnosis" in its initial determination, was a 
reasonable, amply supported finding. Again, it was not an act of "irrationality bordering on 
impropriety" that would warrant disturbing that finding. Therefore, the court rejects Harma's 
"unfounded medical opinions" argument. 
Counsel for Hanna also avers that "the Board impermissibly relied on the commissioners' 
inaccurate personal beliefs about domestic abuse." See petitioner's mem of law at 19-24. 
Counsel here made three specific complaints, including that: I) "first, the Board inappropriately 
inferred that [Harma' s) history of abuse has not been addressed and that she needs further mental 
health services"; 2) "second, the Board improperly based its decision on the commissioners' 
beliefs that, if [the decedent] had truly been emotionally abusive to [Hanna] , she would have left 
him or sought help from her children;" and 3) "third, the Board also improperly relied on its 
personal beliefs that [Hanna] had a non-abusive relationship with [her victim)." /d., at 20, 22. In 
its September 11, 2017 decision, the Commissioner' s Office addressed these three contentions, 
. and made the following findi ngs: 
"Contrary to· appellant's assertion, the Board properly considered her allegations 
of abuse by the victim and their effect upon her mental state. Assessing the 
veracity of these allegations amounts to a credibility determination within the 
8 
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Board's discretion (see Maller ofSiao-Pao v Dennison, 51 AD3d I 05, I08 [JS1 
Dept 2008], afld, II NY3d 777 (2008]). The transcript reflects that appellant 
initiated the discussion of abuse in her relationship with the victim in response to 
an inquiry about the commission of the instant offense and that her parole packet 
included a statement describing the role of abuse in the commission of the crime. 
Given the prominence of these allegations of abuse in appellant's own account of 
her crime, the Board 's resulting inquiry into the effect upon her inental health and 
her mental state at the time of the instant offense was within the scope of the 
statute, (see Matter of Dudley, 227 A02d 863; Matter of Baker, 188 AD2d 771; 
compare Matter of King, 83 NY2d 788). 
"Moreover, the record reflects that the Board's inquiry was directed towards . 
assessing.hei- claim that the instant offense was not premeditated. As an inmate's 
remorse and insight into their commission of the instant offense is h ighly relevant 
to the Board's evaluation of rehabilitation, this inquiry was entirely proper, (see 
Matter of Silmon, 95 NY2d ar477). While appellant indicated in the interview 
that the murder was an unplanned, impulsive act based upon her fear of the 
victim, this was contradicted by statements made by the prosecutor during her 
sentencing hearing arguing that she had, in fact, planned the murder ahead oftime, 
citing arrangements made by appellant prior to the murder, including suspending 
her mail, as well as the allegation that she had previously attempted to kiH the 
victim discussed in the interview. Resolving these conflicting accounts amounted 
to a credibility determination within the Board's purview (see Matter ofSiao-Pao, 
51 AD 3d at I 08)." 
See notice of motion, exhibit R. Counsel for Harma nonetheless contends that the 
Commissioner's interpretation of the Appellate Division, First Department's holding in Matter of 
Siao-Pao v Dennison (51 AD 3d I 05 [ 1 sr Dept 2008], affd II NY3d 777 [2008]) was misplaced. 
See petitioner's mem of law at 23-24. They specifically argue that the Parole Board's discussion 
of domestic abuse with Hanna at her January 10, 2017 hearing was not "a fact driven inquiry like 
the one found in [Siao-Pao ],"because the Parole Board "made statements that contradicted the 
evidence in the record, revealing that the Board was doing much more than assessing the veracity 
of her claims of abuse." !d. (emphasis in original). However, the court has reviewed both the 
administrative record and the transcript of the January I 0, 2017 hearing, and has not discovered 
9 
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any such "contradictions." Instead, counsel appears to have inferred the existence of these 
alleged contradictions from the wording of the Parole Board's questions. By contrast, the 
Commissioner's office noted that Hanna herself had initiated the colloquy with the Parole Board 
commissioners on the topic of domestic abuse, and that the Board members had restricted their 
ensuing questions to matters that were contained in Hanna's PSI and the other material in the 
administrative record. By failing to offer either factual evidence of their purported 
"contradictions," or to identify legal grounds for their apparent inference that the Parole Board 
had made any such "contradictions," counsel for Hanna have failed to demonstrate that the 
Commissioner made an improper determination about the Parole Board's handling of the 
domestic abuse questioning. Therefore, the .court rejects Hanna's "domestic abuse" argument. 
As was previously noted, Hanna's second, "personal beliefs" argument, specified three 
matters about which counsel found Parole Board questioning objectionable. The third of these 
was the Parole Board's alleged reliance·on its "personal beliefs about her ... crime." See 
petitioner's mem of law at l 5. However, Hanna's memorandum of Jaw is devoid of argument on 
this point. As a result, the court deems that Hanna has abandoned this portion of her second 
argument (although she does raise apparently related arguments in other portions of her 
memorandum). Therefore, the cou11 rejects Hanna's second argument in ful l. 
Next, counsel for Hanna argues that ''the Parole Board violated lawful procedure by 
failing to meaningfully consider the required statutory factors." See petitioner's mem of law at 
24-30. To recount, Exec Law§ 259-i (2) (c) (A) enumerates the eight factors to be considered: 
(1) the inmate's insti tutional record; (2) the inmate!s performance in a temporary release 
program; (3) the inmate 's release plans; (4) any federa l deportation order issued against the 
10 
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inmate; (5) any current or prior statement made to the board by the crime victim; 6) the length of 
the determinate sentence to which the inmate would be subject; (7) the seriousness of the . 
offens~; and (8) the inmate's prior criminal record. Counsel for Hanna argues that, at the January 
10, 2017 hearing, the Parole Board: I) gave inadequate consideration to Hanna's institutional 
record; 2) gave undue consideratio_n to Hanna's offense; and 3) gave inadequate weight to 
Hanna's COMPAS score. See petitioner's mem of law at 24-30. The Commissioner's office 
reviewed this argument at Hanna's September 1 I, 20 17 administrative appeal hearing, 
whereupon it found as follows: 
"Appellant's next contentions, that the Board failed to properly consider factors 
weighing in favor of release and instead denied parole based upon the severity of 
the offense alone, are without merit. The record reflects that the Board 
considered, in addition to the severity of the offense, appellant's release plans, 
discipl inary history, programming and vocational achievements, her parole packet, 
which inc] uded her statement of remorse and letters in support of release, the 
COMPAS risk and needs assessment administered by DOCCS, and the minutes 
from her sentencing hearing (during which the Court stated that appellant should 
'receive a greater sentence than that which has been agreed upon between the 
District Attorney's office and the families of both Mr. Rubel and Ms. Hanna'), as 
well as the previously discussed official opposition and mental health status. 
Additionally, at the end of the interview, appellant was given an opportunity to 
make a statement and she declined to address any other factors. 
"Thus, the record reflects that the Board properly considered factors weighing in 
favor of release. That the Board may have accorded more weight to the severity 
of the offense does not render the decision infirm. It is well settled that the weight 
to be accorded each of the requisite factors is within the discretion ofthe Board, 
(see e.g. Matter of King v Stanford, I 3 7 AD 3d 1396 [3d Dept 20 16]; Matter of 
Delacruz v Annucci, 122 AD3d 1413, [4th Dept 2014)). The Board is neither 
required to place equal emphasis on each factor (see Matter of Martinez v Evans, 
108 AD3d 815, 816 [2d Dept. 20 13]; Matter of Comfort v New York Slate Div. of 
Parole, 68 AD3d 1295, 1296 [3d Dept 2009)) nor required to place more 
emphasis on appellant's achievements and rehabilitative successes than on the 
severity of the offense (see·Maller of Moore v New York State Bd. of Parole, 137 
AD3d 1375 [3d Dept. 2016]). Thus the Board's consideration of the severity of 
the offense was not improper (see Matter of LeGeros v New York State Bd. of 
II 
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See petition, exhibit R. In Hanna's petition, counsel cite a quantity of case law in which Parole 
Board denials were overturned because the Board's decisions were overly reliant on the 
"seriousness of the offense" factor, while they merely mentioned the "institutional record" factor 
and the other factors in passing. See, e.g., Matter of Ramirez v Evans, 1I8 AD 3d 707 (2d Dept 
2014); Maller of Perfetto v Evans, 112 AD3d 640 (2d Dept 2013); Maller of King v New York 
State Div. of Parole, 190 AD2d 423 (1 ~~Dept 1993), affd 83 NY2d 788 (I 994). Counsel urges 
that the Commissioner 's office should have applied this line of case law to Hanna's parole 
. . 
application, rather than the precedent that it relied on in the September 11, 2017 administrative 
appeal decision, because the Parole Board 's January I 0, 20 I7 decision did just that. See 
petitioner's mem of law at 24-30. The court disagrees. All of the case law that Hanna 's counsel 
cited involved parole Board decisions that - in addition to overemphasizing the "seriousness of 
the offense" factor and merely mentioning the other factors in passing - were "set forth in 
conclusory terms, which is contrary to law." Matter of Ramirez v Evans, 1I8 AD3d at 707 
[emphasis added). When a decision contains these three features, a court may justly infer that the 
Board has ignored its duty to consider all of the statutory release factors .set forth in Exec Law § 
259-i (2) (c) (A), and simply given undue weight to the seriousness of an inmate's offense. 
However, the instant January I 0, 20I7 Parole board decision cannot be characterized as 
"conclusory." Instead, it is apparent that the Board observed a worrisome qisconnect between 
the overall picture of stabi lity that is presented by Hanna's positive institutional record and 
COMPAS Risk and Needs Assessment score, etc., and her own, less positive self-evaluation. 
See petition, exhibit A. It is evident that this Board did not ignore the other parole det~rmination 
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factors set forth in Exec La.w § 259-i (2) (c) (A) in favor of the "seriousness of the offense" 
factor, but rather that the Board accorded that factor greater weight after considering them all. 
The Commissioner's office was correct to note that the applicable case law accords the Parole 
Board the discretion to proceed in this manner. See e.g. Matter of Moore v New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 137 AD3d 1375, 1376 (3d Dept 2016). As a result, the Commissioner's office's 
determination of the "statutory factors" argument was arrived at reasonably, in accordance with 
the law, and dis not constitute an act of"irrationality bordering on impropriety." Therefore, the 
court rejects Hanna's third argument. 
Next, counsel for Hanna argues that "the Parole Board 's deci sion was arbitrary and 
capricious because it gave impermissible weight to the seriousness of the crime." See 
petitioner's mem of law at 30-35. However, the court has ·already rejected this contention for the 
reasons set fo~th above, Therefore, the court also rejects Hanna's fourth argument _for those same 
reasons. 
Finally, counsel for Hanna argues that "the Parole Board's decision was unlawful because 
it failed to explain its denial in detailed and non-conclusory terms, and its determination is not 
supported by the record." See petitioner's mem of law at 36-39. However, as was discussed 
above, "conclusory" is an inaccurate characterization of the Parole Board's January I 0, 20 17 
determination. Therefore, the court rejects Hanna' s fifth argument. Accordingly, having found 
that none of her arguments are meritorious, the court finds that the Commissioner's decision was 
not "arbitrary and capricious," and that Hanna's Article 78 petition should be dismissed. 
. . 
DECISION 
ACCORDINGLY, for the foregoing reasons it is hereby 
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ADJl)DGED that the petition <;>f for relief, pursuant to CPLR Article 78, of petitioner 
Gai l Hanna is denied, and the petition is dismissed. And it is further 
ORDERED that counsel for Petitioner shall serve a copy of this Order with Notice of 
Entry within twenty (20) days of entry on counsel for Respondent. 
Dated: New York , New York 
May 29, 2018 
ENTER: 
.~I{SL-£. 
Hon. Carol R. Edmead, JSC 
HON. CAA.OL R. EDIViEAD 
J.S.C. 
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